Participation Amount. Commencing on and after the Project Completion, Clean Line shall pay to the easement grantor (landowner) at the end of each fiscal quarter an amount equal to 2% of the gross revenues received by the Clean Line Parties from the Project during such fiscal quarter resulting from the sale of transmission service in connection with the Project (as such gross revenue amount is reflected in Clean Line's Financial Statements for such fiscal quarter, including, with respect to the first such fiscal quarter, sales of transmission service which occurred at any time prior to Project Completion) (the “Participation Amount”).
The Participation Amounts shall be paid to landowner to offset costs associated with having their property devalued and their quality of life disturbed in perpetuity, or for any other landowner authorized purpose.

The Department of Energy has released it's record of Decision on Plains and Eastern. They have opted to participate in the project, however, there appear to be numerous conditions Clean Line will have to meet.

While we are disappointed with the the decision, there are numerous legal, procedural, and meritorious questions, raised by multiple parties, we believe are still unanswered. We have long felt the fate of the Plains and Eastern project will not be decided by the DOE or Clean Line, but rather in a court of law.

Going forward, our focus will be educating landowners about their rights, the process, the powers (or lack thereof) that have been granted to Clean Line, as well as the legal options available to them as we evaluate the contents of the Record of Decision and other documents.

“We believe that the East Coast has access to abundant offshore wind and that any time you talk about green or clean, you should also be talking about local,” she said. “Unnecessary long-haul transmission lines are not our country’s future.”

This Commission has not before endorsed the policy that the activities of non-decisional
intervenor groups be funded through a dedicated utility tariff under the auspices of the FPA. Yet here we are doing exactly that. Today’s order is couched in the language of
good intentions, but I find it troubling  precedent as both a matter of policy and prudence.

My public policy concern is that there is little that meaningfully differentiates these
organizations from a myriad of other state agencies and not-for-profit governmental
organizations or other interest groups that will now say, “what about my piece of the
pie?” CAPS entities argue they are uniquely situated. But aren’t state energy offices, in
their own way, also uniquely situated? What about state departments of environmental
quality? Do they, too, deserve a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) funded
organization to finance their participation in stakeholder meetings? Furthermore, given
that CAPS includes at least one non-governmental non-profit, we now have cracked-open the lid of Pandora’s Box just a little wider yet. What is to stop any of the countless groups that intersect with the regulatory world from arguing that they are also uniquely situated to speak for any  number of communities of interest?

(a)
(1) There shall be an office in the Commission to be known as the Office of Public Participation (hereinafter in this section referred to as the “Office”).
(2)
(A) The Office shall be administered by a Director. The Director shall be appointed by the Chairman with the approval of the Commission. The Director may be removed during his term of office by the Chairman, with the approval of the Commission, only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.
(B) The term of office of the Director shall be 4 years. The Director shall be responsible for the discharge of the functions and duties of the Office. He shall be appointed and compensated at a rate not in excess of the maximum rate prescribed for GS–18 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of title 5.
(3) The Director may appoint, and assign the duties of, employees of such Office, and with the concurrence of the Commission he may fix the compensation of such employees and procure temporary and intermittent services to the same extent as is authorized under section 3109 of title 5.
(b)
(1) The Director shall coordinate assistance to the public with respect to authorities exercised by the Commission. The Director shall also coordinate assistance available to persons intervening or participating or proposing to intervene or participate in proceedings before the Commission.
(2) The Commission may, under rules promulgated by it, provide compensation for reasonable attorney’s fees, expert witness fees, and other costs of intervening or participating in any proceeding before the Commission to any person whose intervention or participation substantially contributed to the approval, in whole or in part, of a position advocated by such person. Such compensation may be paid only if the Commission has determined that--
(A) the proceeding is significant, and
(B) such person’s intervention or participation in such proceeding without receipt of compensation constitutes a significant financial hardship to him.
(3) Nothing in this subsection affects or restricts any rights of any intervenor or participant under any other applicable law or rule of law.
(4) There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Energy to be used by the Office for purposes of compensation of persons under the provisions of this subsection not to exceed $500,000 for the fiscal year 1978, not to exceed $2,000,000 for the fiscal year 1979, not to exceed $2,200,000 for the fiscal year 1980, and not to exceed $2,400,000 for the fiscal year 1981.

The Office of Public Participation is also needed to provide support to communities involved with FERC-jurisdictional hydro and natural gas infrastructure proposals.

With its disapproval last July, the Public Service Commission (PSC) invited CLE to correct some serious deficiencies in their application and re-apply. The most serious deficiency noted by the PSC was that CLE had no specific electric customers in the state.

.........................

But the PSC rejected their original application, encouraging the company to find specific wholesale customers within the state.

As some parties have recently noted, GBE has the option to file a new application for a CCN at any point if it eventually gathers information it feels would make a better case for this project or a new project. See Staff’s Response to the Recommendation of Grain Belt Express Clean Line LLC, EFIS No. 544, and Response of the Missouri Landowners Alliance to Recommendation of Grain Belt Express to Hold Case in Abeyance, EFIS No. 540.

GBE has failed to meet, by a preponderance of the evidence, its burden of proof to demonstrate that the Project as described in its application for a certificate of convenience and necessity is necessary or convenient for the public service.

When making a determination of whether an applicant or project is convenient or necessary, the Commission has traditionally applied five criteria, commonly known as the Tartan factors, which are as follows:

1. a)  There must be a need for the service;
   
2. b)  The applicant must be qualified to provide the proposed service;
   
3. c)  The applicant must have the financial ability to provide the service;
   
4. d)  The applicant’s proposal must be economically feasible; and
   
5. e)  The service must promote the public interest.
   

However, the evidence showed that the Project is not needed for Missouri investor-owned utilities to meet the requirements of the RES.

The Project is not needed for grid reliability because GBE did not submit the Project to the regional planning process, has not identified any existing deficiency or inadequacy in the grid that the project addresses, and has not shown that the project is the best or least- cost way to achieve more reliability. 

Although GBE elected not to submit the Project to the MISO regional transmission process, MISO has an effective planning process to enable states in the MISO footprint, which includes portions of Missouri, to meet RES requirements using renewable wind resources. Since areas of MISO have some of the best wind energy resources in the United States, it is more likely that the large amount of available MISO wind can satisfy the needs of Missouri utilities for wind energy compared to the smaller amount of Kansas wind that GBE proposes to inject into MISO at the Missouri converter station. The Commission concludes that GBE has failed to meet its burden of proof to demonstrate that the service it proposes in its application for a certificate of convenience and necessity is needed in Missouri.

GBE has not presented adequate evidence to show that the Project is economically feasible.
Staff made credible criticisms of the GBE studies and pointed out the large amount of important information that is not known about the impact of the Project on Missouri. Interconnection studies with SPP, MISO and PJM have not been completed or are inconsistent with the Project’s current design, plans for operations, maintenance or emergency restoration have not yet been developed by GBE, and GBE production modeling studies do not support GBE’s claims that retail electric rates would decrease. In addition, there is a good chance that Project costs would increase beyond what was estimated by GBE due to transmission upgrades, congestion, wind integration and the need for additional ramping capacity.
Dr. Michael Proctor presented credible evidence that Ameren Missouri would have lower-cost alternatives than the Project for meeting its need for capacity and energy, both with and without considering the renewable energy requirements of the Missouri RES. GBE failed to perform adequate studies and present sufficient evidence on this analysis, which the Commission would need to properly evaluate economic feasibility of the Project. Dr. Proctor’s analysis showed that natural gas-fired combined cycle generation is the most cost-effective generation alternative, and that wind energy from areas of MISO or through the purchase of RECs are a lower cost alternative to wind energy generated by the Project. Therefore, the Project is not the least-cost alternative for meeting Missouri’s future needs for either energy and capacity or renewable energy, so it is highly unlikely to meet the Commission’s rule for 1% rate impact limitation from renewable energy.

Since the Commission has concluded that GBE has not met two of the Tartan factors, by that standard GBE cannot show that the Project promotes the public interest.

However, the Commission will also consider further some of the specific public benefits of the Project claimed by GBE.

As Staff witnesses point out, as a result of GBE’s inadequate production modeling studies, GBE’s claims that the Project would lead to lower renewable energy compliance costs, lower wholesale electric prices, lower retail electric rates, and reduce the need to generate electricity from fossil-fueled power plants are not sufficiently supported by the record. Moreover, the Project is not needed to satisfy the Missouri RES requirements. Although GBE argues that the Project will make wind energy more accessible to MISO and PJM customers, the evidence shows that wind energy is already accessible in those regions and, at least in MISO, has more than doubled as a percentage of total energy generated in the last three years. GBE alleges that the Project would result in economic benefits, but its studies are not reliable, as they fail to consider any negative economic impacts resulting from job displacement and energy production. Finally, GBE touts the Project as a way for Missouri to access affordable clean energy as increasing environmental regulations increase costs for coal plants. It is too soon to say what the impact of the proposal will be on Missouri.

In this case the evidence shows that any actual benefits to the general public from the Project are outweighed by the burdens on affected landowners. The Commission concludes that GBE has failed to meet its burden of proof to demonstrate that the Project as described in its application for a certificate of convenience and necessity promotes the public interest.

If Egyptology suddenly came into fashion in Oregon, and enthusiasts convinced the state to use its ratemaking powers to advance the cause, utilities would gladly build a pyramid in Portland, and they would make money doing so.