- Landowners who object to new transmission receive electricity through transmission lines on someone else's property;
- Climate change necessitates a major shift in power production that must be accomplished in a big, big hurry;
- Local renewables are "too expensive";
- It's for the "greater good" and therefore supersedes the right of individuals to own and enjoy property.
Our country was electrified through the use of eminent domain. It was the only way to provide electric service to all who wanted it. Now everyone has electricity, and those who want new service choose whether to pay the cost of extending electric lines to serve their property, or building their own generation onsite. That is a simple economic argument -- would the cost of extending centralized generation to the property be more or less than building and maintaining distributed generation to serve the property. In many parts of the world, distributed generation is the option that makes sense.
But utility eminent domain is no longer about providing individuals with reliable basic service. It's now oftentimes used to provide lower cost electric service, or to provide a different "renewable" kind of generation required by public policies. This is where utility eminent domain starts sliding down the slippery slope of "public use." Can "the public" necessity for more economic or environmentally responsible electricity trump the right of the individual to own and enjoy property? Where does the responsibility of "the public" to be responsible for their own footprint enter into the equation?
If the current electric supply for "the public" in one location is more expensive than electric supply for "the public" in another location, does that give utilities the right to take private property in order to levelize electric prices between localities? In such a scheme, consumers enjoying cheaper electricity must sacrifice by paying more for their electricity in order that other consumers in a different region can enjoy cheaper prices. And landowners in between these two regions must sacrifice their personal property to grant easements for new transmission lines to effect this economic benefit for one group of consumers.
The same argument can be made about transmission lines "for renewables" (as if transmission lines could segregate "clean" from "dirty" energy - it's all the same when it's transmitted). Consumers who live in regions where renewables are cheap and plentiful enjoy lower electric prices. When those renewables are exported to other regions where renewables have failed to properly and economically develop (notice I did not say regions where there are no renewables, because such places simply don't exist), it raises prices for consumers who previously enjoyed low prices because supply exceeded demand. And it requires them to make a sacrifice so that consumers in other regions can enjoy the low-priced renewables they failed to develop themselves.
We get here because of electricity markets. Electric markets are run by organizations who also control electric transmission. Electric transmission is the only tool these organizations have to control their artificial electric markets by moving electricity around their own region, or to other regions. Electric transmission organizations cannot order new generation to be built as a way to control their markets, lower prices, or support environmental "public policies." Eminent domain cannot be used to force new generation, but it can be used to force new transmission. This mismatch between the power of a "market" to force transmission, but not generation, makes no sense.
If a particular region needs renewable generation, or lower cost electricity, an unfettered market would force it to be built. Instead, the current electric "market" forces transmission before market forces can be allowed to do their work to encourage new generation. This isn't a true "market," it's top down force that causes unnecessary sacrifice on the part of individuals who will receive no benefit in order to provide for the needs of others. If regions that have failed to develop their own renewable resources must pay more to develop them now, then that's the cost of environmentally-friendly consumption. If regions with more expensive power need cheaper prices, then they should build cheaper generators, or change policies that suppress generation and drive up its cost. Example: The east coast cities have traditionally relied on coal-fired generators in the Ohio Valley to supply them with cheap electricity because their own environmental restrictions or costs imposed on coal-fired generators prevented them from generating economic coal-fired electricity in their own neighborhood. The Ohio Valley destroyed its people and environment in order to ship cheap electricity east to serve the cities. Now the cities don't want any more coal-fired power, but they have been trained to be helpless leeches, incapable of providing for their own electric needs. Many of these NIMBYs continue to think that other regions enjoy sacrificing themselves for city needs. They somehow think other regions enjoy some economic benefit from serving them. One only need look at West Virginia as an example that any economic benefit from the sacrifice didn't flow to the people -- it went into the pockets of the out-of-state companies who exploited the state's natural resources for the last 100 years.
Climate change has happened gradually over hundreds of years of our industrial expansion. It cannot be changed overnight. The big rush to switch to renewables won't happen quickly. And it certainly shouldn't be used as a basis to require sacrifice of personal property rights to allow new renewable energy projects. Renewables will develop where they are welcomed by people who want to pay to use them. Arguing that development of more expensive local renewables isn't worthwhile effectively rejects climate change arguments entirely.
And, again, we have another mismatch between generation and transmission when it comes to renewables. The siting of renewable energy generators is an entirely voluntary process -- no eminent domain can be used to obtain land for wind farms, for instance. In that case, renewable generation developers have to operate in a voluntary real estate market to acquire land for their projects. These landowners are compensated at a rate that entices their voluntary participation, oftentimes receiving royalties and other long-term financial compensation for the use of their land. But voluntarily-sited renewable generators may require new transmission lines to tap into existing transmission systems, and request the use of eminent domain to get there. On the one hand, landowners hosting generators are well-compensated because their participation is voluntary, but on the other hand, landowners hosting the transmission lines that make generation profits happen are involuntarily forced to take one-time "market value" payments and sacrifice their property. Everyone participating in the production of getting renewable generation to market is not compensated equally.
And here's another incongruity... when eminent domain is used to acquire land for transmission lines planned by regional organizations and cost allocated to all ratepayers in a region, the ratepayers realize the benefit of the cheaper land acquisition accomplished by eminent domain through "cost of service" transmission rates. However, new "merchant" transmission projects proposed are not supported by cost of service rates, but by market rates. A merchant project is financed wholly by its investors, not ratepayers. It depends on market prices for transmission service in order to set its rates through a voluntary negotiation process. The users of its line negotiate a price for service. The merchant transmission owner can collect whatever rate it can negotiate in this voluntary market. In that case, any lower land acquisition values created by eminent domain flow directly to the investors. Eminent domain does not affect the market for transmission service -- that market remains unaffected whether land acquisition for transmission rights of way is voluntary or coerced through eminent domain. The merchant transmission ratepayers do not realize any financial benefit from the use of eminent domain for land acquisition. A merchant transmission project is a market-based endeavor -- it's success depends entirely on market forces. Therefore, why isn't a merchant transmission project's land acquisition also subject to the same market forces? A market-based merchant project should be required to negotiate land acquisition prices with voluntary landowners in the same free market in which it negotiates prices for its transmission with voluntary users.
Those who casually spout off that new transmission is "for the greater good" and therefore deserving of landowner sacrifice through the acquisition of rights of way through eminent domain aren't aren't dealing with a full deck. It's all so much self-interested hogwash. Who determines when transmission is "for the greater good?" Not the folks who stand to benefit from it. The "greater good" includes everyone. Equally.