In his comments, Neilan pointed out how IPA's idea of the finances of merchant transmission is wrong. Government ideas about merchant transmission are almost always wrong. Nobody seems to understand how it works, so they make things up and pretend they understand. Because governments don't understand how merchant transmission works and how it differs from regionally planned and cost allocated transmission needed for reliability, merchant transmission developers often have a field day making up need and benefits for their projects to make ignorant regulators believe they somehow provide "public benefit" that will enable eminent domain authority for private profit.
First Neilan takes issue with IPA's claim that merchant transmission makes money through power price arbitrage:
These descriptions misstate the revenue model of a merchant transmission service provider, and the Agency's Figure 7-3 is misleading because it creates the impression that the merchant transmission service provider is obtaining commodity electricity supply at a low price and then selling that commodity electricity supply at a higher price in a different area (i.e., price arbitrage) in order to recover its costs.
A merchant transmission service provider sells transmission service, not commodity electricity supply.
comments_on_illinois_power_agency_2024_policy_statementdraft_final.pdf |
Neilan points out that the price difference between seller and buyer must be more than the cost of GBE. This is the reason GBE doesn't yet have enough customers to finance and build its project. The price differential between seller and buyer is so small that it doesn't allow the addition of the bloated $7B GBE project and still allow an arbitrage profit. He attaches a portion of a transcript from the ICC hearing that demonstrates how GBE witnesses dodge and weave when asked questions they would rather not answer because a truthful answer isn't helpful.
Merchant transmission claims of electricity cost reductions are magic math.
Though merchant transmission developers may claim that their projects will reduce electricity costs for consumers, as the example above shows, any decrease in the electricity price at the point of delivery necessarily reduces the price arbitrage opportunity and is, therefore, contrary to the merchant transmission developer’s economic self-interest as a profit-maximizing enterprise."
The magic math GBE used at the ICC to create $6.6B of savings for electric consumers is a story unto itself. You should read Neilan's explanation of GBE's non-existent carbon tax and failure to adjust the time value of money. Geeky topic, easy explanation.
Perhaps IPA's biggest flaw is its presumption that eminent domain is appropriate for merchant transmission projects:
In its discussion of “Land Ownership,” which the Study presents as a mere obstacle to merchant transmission development, the Agency states:
"In cases where the public utility commission or transmission siting authority approves a transmission line, the state has the authority to use the land for public use and pay the landowner compensation."
(Study, pg. 159). Here, the Agency accepts without question the proposition that a merchant transmission project is a “public use” of the private property of Illinois landowners. This acceptance ignores the nature of merchant transmission as an entirely profit-driven enterprise. In 22-0499, the only party alleging that GBX’s merchant transmission project is needed to relieve grid congestion, enhance reliability, or provide adequate service was GBX itself. Such self- serving assertions may be entirely discounted.
Hopefully Neilan can straighten out the IPA's screwy thinking. It's a vital first step!