So, who did the best job briefing the GBE case? Hands down the best brief was written by the Missouri Landowners Alliance attorney, Paul Agathen. Legal briefs, by their very nature, can be very dry, boring and sleep inducing. The rare brief that adds a little personality and common humanity is a gem. Especially when it is extremely persuasive and opens new trains of thought.
One such nugget I gleaned from the MLA brief is that perhaps GBE is trying just a bit too hard. Since GBE's application is for an amendment to its existing CCN, the only thing it needed to prove was that the amendments were needed and in the public interest. GBE did not need to re-prove the general need for the project or its benefits. But that's exactly what GBE did (and continues to do on brief), creating a blizzard of words designed to obscure the fact that there IS NO NEED for the amendments. The most GBE could say is that Missouri would receive benefits "sooner" than it otherwise would by about 18 months. That just doesn't add up against the huge expense of this proceeding to the PSC, Invenergy and all the other parties to the case. They probably spent more than any supposed early "benefits." A thinking person might suspect that there's an ulterior motive behind all this, and the possibilities are endless. I won't detail them all here... that's another blog. Just remember... if it doesn't ring true, it simply isn't. Let's hope the PSC thinks long and hard on this simple fact.
Here's a few delicious snippets from the MLA brief that everyone can understand:
Grain Belt is also in the process of shifting some of the risk of the project to taxpayers, through its application to the DOE for a loan guarantee for a substantial portion of the construction costs. And by shifting a portion of the risk of the project to taxpayers, Grain Belt will no longer be bearing all of its risks – raising the question of whether it is still are a merchant project.
Under the terms of the FERC order which initially granted Grain Belt the authority to negotiate rates with its customers, Grain Belt is required to solicit potential buyers of capacity through what is called an “open solicitation” process. Grain Belt began the customer solicitation process in January of 2015 – more than 8 and a half years ago. Yet despite its concerted efforts to do so, since that time Grain Belt has failed to sell a single MW of capacity at market rates.
And on the subject of GBE's potential customers, there's this nugget that demonstrates GBE's puffery about having customers.
Grain Belt’s lack of success is certainly not due to a lack of trying. After the close of the previous CCN case, Grain Belt has been actively seeking, although unsuccessfully, to sell capacity on its line at a sustainable rate.
At one point Grain Belt had signed Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with three entities for the sale of capacity on the Project. But the period for further good faith negotiations regarding each of those MOUs has now expired. Therefore, those parties have no obligation to buy anything from Grain Belt or to even engage in future negotiations with Grain Belt. In addition, Grain Belt signed a Letter of Intent with another party regarding the sale of an interest in the Project, but the commercial terms of that proposal had not even been disclosed by Grain Belt to the counter-party at the time the testimony was filed in this case. Thus at this point, the Letter of Intent is at best nothing more than a non-binding MOU. Also, last year Grain Belt submitted proposals to four utilities for the sale of varying interests in the Project. Apparently, none of those utilities has accepted or even formally responded to Grain Belt’s proposed sales.
In summary, despite its on-going efforts to do so, Grain Belt has failed for nine years now to sell even a single MW of capacity at a sustainable rate. Yet they continue to hope that if they build the Project, the customers will come. Given Grain Belt’s track record over these past nine years, it is time to recognize that the emperor has no clothes.
Invenergy recently filed a formal complaint with the FERC against MISO regarding the way MISO treats the Grain Belt Project in MISO’s long-term transmission planning process.
Briefly, Invenergy’s complaint is that MISO does not include the Grain Belt project in MISO’s “base case” in its yearly evaluation of what additional transmission projects MISO should add.
Invenergy no doubt knows exactly what it was doing in filing the complaint case against MISO. If it is successful, its efforts in that proceeding could prevent MISO from pursuing alternative transmission service that could duplicate Grain Belt’s Project. If Grain Belt is attempting to eliminate competition from the MISO projects, it is fair to ask how confident Grain Belt could be in its own financial viability.
Grain Belt contends that its investors bear the risk of the Project. However, as Staff has observed, “Invenergy has repeatedly petitioned FERC to require RTOs to pay for the presumed benefits of this and other merchant HVDC projects, which could result in Missouri ratepayers paying for the project regardless of use by Missouri Utilities.”
On the issue of financial viability, Grain Belt has apparently recognized a need for additional revenue sources in order to bolster the viability of its Project. Until now, GrainBelt’s revenue was to be derived solely from the sale of capacity on the line. Now, as another means to raise revenue, Grain Belt is also offering to sell or lease an undivided interest in the ownership of the line itself.
Ms. Shine stated that the undivided interests would be a sale for the exclusive use of the line by the purchaser. However, exclusive use is not a public use. While the issue is not ripe for a decision in this case, if Grain Belt sells undivided interests for all or a significant portion of the Project, the MLA contends Grain Belt would no longer be a “public utility” or serve a “public use.”
Coming up next... reply briefs. I think we can expect more of the same.