As I wrote about extensively last year, greedy merchant transmission developers (hello, Clean Line) whose projects failed because they could not find any customers to sign up for service have set their bought and paid for Congress critters in motion to create fake "customers" for their unneeded projects so that they can be "needed", financed and built.
The DOE is seeking comment on how to implement this ridiculous, new "program" set in motion by the passing of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Bill. They have written a rather short (in regulatory terms) plan on how they are going to carry it out.
The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA or the Act) directs the Secretary of Energy (Secretary) to establish a program, to be known as the “Transmission Facilitation Program” or “TFP,” under which the Secretary shall facilitate the construction of electric power transmission lines and related facilities. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE or Department) Grid Deployment Office is issuing this NOI to notify interested parties of its intent to implement the TFP and to describe the proposed approach for participation by eligible entities in the TFP. The Department also seeks input from all stakeholders through this RFI regarding the application process, criteria for qualification, and selection of eligible projects to participate in the TFP.
(19) The IIJA calls on DOE to seek to enter into capacity contracts that will encourage other entities to enter into contracts for the transmission capacity of the eligible projects. On what basis should DOE assess whether a capacity contract with an applicant will encourage other entities to enter contracts for transmission capacity?
Here's another you may like:
12) Recognizing that transmission projects are located based on the availability of generation, and ultimately customers to buy that generation, and have limited long term direct employment impacts:
- What equity, energy and environmental justice concerns or priorities are most relevant for the TFP? How can these concerns or priorities be addressed in TFP implementation?
DOE participation is to help provide certainty to developers, operators, and marketers that customer revenue will be sufficient to justify the construction of a transmission line that meets current and future needs. Applications for capacity contracts are not required to account for National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) environmental impact review, because DOE's entry into a capacity contract does not independently trigger NEPA review.
And here's another topic that DOE pretty much ignores. Merchant transmission is market based. That is, there must be a market need for it. Customers must be willing to pay to use it. Merchant transmission has no captive customers who must pay for the project as part of their electric bill. Merchant transmission is a completely optional, money-making endeavor and never necessary for you to get economic, reliable electric service. Those kinds of projects are ordered by grid planners and recovered involuntarily as part of your bill. Merchant Transmission is lightly regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission because it does not have involuntary customers who must be protected. FERC may grant what's known as "Negotiated Rate Authority", which allows the merchant transmission developer to advertise its service and negotiate rate contracts with voluntary customers. FERC regulates whether this process is fair to all customers. But if the DOE is required to purchase capacity on merchant transmission projects, then it no longer qualifies as merchant transmission because DOE is a captive customer who must be protected with regulated cost of service rates. When a merchant with Negotiated Rate Authority advertises and sells available capacity, there are strict guidelines the merchant must follow. But what about DOE? Who's going to be regulating them to make sure their sale of transmission capacity to all those future fence painters, who just gotta have what the government already bought, is fair? Is one branch of the government going to be regulating the other? DOE and FERC need to address how this will be handled, even though the merchant transmission lobbyists who wrote the law did not address it (probably because... well... stupid... they don't know how rates work).
And for those readers who successfully battled the Plains and Eastern Clean Line at great expense of time and money, perhaps you'd like to share a little wisdom you gained from the experience of DOE "participating" in that project for the express purpose of using federal eminent domain when Arkansas said "no"? In that instance, DOE required Clean Line to have capacity contract customers before building, and Clean Line never could find any, which was the ultimate reason DOE cancelled its "participation agreement." With that knowledge, how could DOE do better this time around in order to avoid years of misery?
The commenting form is quick and easy. Please use it. Time is short. Sometimes the best defense is a good offense. And DOE's new program is about as offensive as it gets. Don't wait to act until a transmission road to nowhere that doesn't actually deliver electricity anywhere because there are no real customers taking service is sited outside your front door.